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
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Elizabeth D. Sherwood

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Prepared for

The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy

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The research described in this report was sponsored by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy under Contract No. MDA903-85-C-0030.

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Published by The Rand Corporation

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PREFACE

With the United States playing an important role in protecting Western interests outside Europe, most Americans expect that the other Western nations, especially the industrialized allies, will cooperate in many of the endeavors this entails. This Note examines the history of such cooperation and the options open to the United States to encourage what it sees as appropriate assistance. It also treats some of the limits to cooperation which U.S. diplomats see in operation.

This Note was adapted for Rand use by the author from portions of her Oxford University doctoral dissertation.

The Note is a contribution to a Rand project on enhancing the support by friends and allies for U.S. maneuver forces. It was funded by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy under Contract No. MDA903-85-C-0030.



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SUMMARY

Recent events demonstrate that neither Western security nor the politics of the Atlantic Alliance can be insulated from developments beyond Europe. The effective management of so-called "out-of-area" problems is critical to the maintenance of Alliance cohesion. Yet in the last few years, the Alliance has debated at length the responsibilities of its members to support common interests outside the NATO treaty area.

This Note points out that NATO's security was never insulated from developments beyond Europe and that the NATO partners have long consulted one another on the problems thus raised. Individual allied countries, and in particular the United States, Great Britain, and France, have always maintained global interests and commitments. While differences over analysis and objectives have proved a source of interallied friction, concerted action has proved an effective means of advancing Western interests and furthering Alliance cohesion.

But since the early seventies, out-of-area problems have assumed a new urgency and a new importance, and have required a more concerted effort on the part of the United States. Current U.S. policy is defined by a two-track approach toward out-of-area developments. Within the formal NATO context, the United States is requesting augmented allied contributions both within and beyond Europe to support its commitment to the defense of Southwest Asia. Simultaneously, the United States is pursuing global cooperation with key allies informally; that is, on a bilateral or multilateral basis outside the NATO framework. The result is the existence of a de facto "Principal Nations" approach to the management of Alliance politics beyond Europe. The presence of the MNF in Lebanon was a key example of this process.

The debate over out-of-area developments also reflects the impact that domestic constraints in the member countries have on Alliance politics. The Note examines the attitudes toward out-of-area issues in the United States and the four principal allied countries--the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Italy.

Finally, the Note explores the variety of policy options open to the United States, establishing the premise that the objectives of U.S. policy must be twofold: first, to increase Western security by furthering the global interests of the Alliance, and second, to limit the negative "spillover" of extra-European problems on the core NATO security agenda. It argues against far-reaching reform, contending that attempts to extend the physical domain of allied responsibility or to create new institutions for out-of-area cooperation are likely to be counterproductive or ineffective. It urges the United States to sustain the formal effort to raise allied awareness about the potential impact of out-of-area developments to NATO's security, and where possible, to increase allied contributions. The Note recommends continued use of the informal approach for the management of specific crises. This suggests that there will be no permanent solutions to out-of-area problems for NATO, but rather that they will be a permanent feature of Alliance politics.

1.

Recent events demonstrate that neither Western security nor the politics of the Atlantic Alliance can be insulated from strategic developments beyond Europe. The U.S.-European agenda is top-heavy with so called "out-of-area" issues; in the last few years, developments in the Middle East and Southwest Asia (Lebanon, the Iran-Iraq war), Africa (Chad, Namibia), and the Western Hemisphere (Grenada, Nicaragua, El Salvador, the Falkland Islands) have figured prominently in the life of the Atlantic Alliance. Indeed, since the deployment of intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe appears to have passed its critical phase, out-of-area problems may pose the greatest threat to Alliance cohesion. Both the direct capacity of the individual allied nations to advance or hinder one another's foreign policy goals around the world and the indirect "spillover" effect that events beyond Europe can have on core NATO defense interests make the effective management of Alliance politics outside the European theater of critical import today.

Despite the prominence of out-of-area issues, little has been written about the politics of out-of-area cooperation within the Alliance. Moreover, the Atlantic Alliance has no institutions dedicated to coping with crises beyond Europe. Yet this absence of attention ought not to be taken as a sign that all is well, but rather as an indication of the messiness of the subject and the dearth of perfect solutions.

There is a lively debate as to how NATO could better manage out-of-area developments. Some argue that the area and/or agenda covered by the NATO Treaty should be officially extended; others push for the creation of new institutions for the coordination of policy outside the European theater. The trouble with these "new" ideas is that they are unlikely to increase Western cooperation; instead, experience suggests that by trying to do more, the Alliance could well end up with less.

II.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was formed in 1949 to provide for the collective defense of its members against an attack from the Soviet Union. Although there is no mention in the NATO Treaty of any explicit responsibilities beyond the territory articulated in the pact, out-of-area problems are nothing new. The Alliance never enjoyed a golden period when it could isolate itself from developments beyond its borders. During the debate over the establishment of NATO, U.S. policymakers resisted European endeavors to gain collective--and in particular American--commitments to expand their shared security responsibilities beyond the area eventually included in Article Six of the Treaty.¹ This approach was largely determined by the U.S. desire to maintain global freedom of maneuver and to avoid close association with the colonialist policies of European governments. Now, ironically, the tables have largely been turned: the United States is urging greater allied support for its global involvements and the Europeans are shying away from joint action for fear such association could diminish their security within Europe or limit their margin of maneuver beyond.

Although the physical domain of allied responsibility was officially resolved by the Treaty in 1949,² these initial agreements did

¹For a colorful and insightful description of the debate about the scope and domain of allied responsibility, see Sir Nicholas Henderson, *The Birth of NATO* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1982).

²Article Six of the North Atlantic Treaty states: "For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack:

- on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France, on the territory of Turkey or on the islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer;
- on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer."

Article Six was amended by Article Two of the Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty to allow the accession of Greece and Turkey in 1951, and

not take into account the strategic importance to the Atlantic partners of extra-European developments. Thus while NATO concentrated on Western Europe, individual Alliance members of necessity watched the world through a wider lens. The historical record reflects the salience of out-of-area issues in Alliance politics. Developments beyond Europe have both offered opportunities for cooperation and the advancement of Western interests as well as created friction and undermined Alliance cohesion. Many characteristics of the management of out-of-area problems within the Alliance were already apparent in the 1950s.

From the beginning it was standard practice for NATO partners to consult with one another on global threats to their security. The British effort to extract an American commitment to the defense of Southeast Asia in 1949-50 was the earliest example of the notion of the indivisibility of security with the Alliance framework.³ Although the Truman Administration resisted British entreaties, the North Korean invasion of South Korea in June 1950 triggered an American commitment on a scale even the British never anticipated. While action under NATO auspices was never at issue, the perception of a threat to Western security emanating from Asia motivated several allied countries, including Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, and the United Kingdom to fight alongside the United States outside the Treaty area. Greece and Turkey, which acceded to the Alliance in 1952, also sent troops. Other allies--Denmark, Italy, and Norway--contributed medical aid.⁴ As the war dragged on, however, some allies became concerned that the United States might go to war with Communist China and thereby lead Europe into World War III. They also worried that American defense expenditures in Southeast Asia were draining away resources from Western Europe. Both of these concerns proved unfounded; indeed, Korea not only symbolized the ability of the Atlantic allies to cooperate far afield, but one of

by the accession of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1954. As of July, 1962, Algeria was no longer considered a part of NATO, as it had gained its independence from France.

³Ritchie Ovendal, "Britain, the United States and the Cold War in South-East Asia 1949-1950," *International Affairs*, Vol. 58, No. 3 (Summer 1982), pp. 447-464.

⁴See David Rees, *Korea: The Limited War* (New York: St. Martin's Press: 1964), pp. 32-33. Specific contributions are detailed in Appendix A, p. 457.

the conflict's key legacies was that it convinced Washington to provide the funding necessary for a credible defense of Europe.⁶

Four years later, the U.S. refusal to provide the military support needed to rescue the encircled French garrison at Dien Ben Phu demonstrated the extent to which out-of-area developments could strain relations amongst the principal allies. This crisis in Franco-American relations underlined the fact that the NATO commitment did not extend to colonial territories. Given the importance of colonial possessions to the French, the U.S. reaction raised serious doubts in France about the wisdom of dependence upon the United States. Dien Ben Phu was thus a precursor to Suez, the greatest out-of-area crisis the Alliance has yet known. The course of the 1956 crisis has been studied extensively; for the purposes of this Note, what is crucial about Suez is that it demonstrated the potential of out-of-area crises to affect the cohesion of the Alliance. Suez gave rise to centrifugal attitudes that undermined allied solidarity. In the United States, it reinforced the conviction that the European allies should not be allowed to determine Western policy in the Middle East; in Great Britain, it engendered a mentality of dependence and impotence; and in France, it solidified the commitment to ensuring that the nation should never again have to rely on the United States for the defense of its interests.

Indeed, French President Charles de Gaulle's nationalist appeal can only be understood against the background of Suez. De Gaulle's secret proposal in the late 1950s for a "Tridirectorate," or *directoire*, consisting of the United States, Great Britain, and France, to chart allied global policies reflected the emergent French endeavor to regain political leverage in and for Europe. He suggested that the three powers should, on an equal basis, "have the responsibility for taking joint decisions on all political matters affecting world security, and of drawing up and, if necessary, putting into action strategic plans, especially those involving the use of nuclear weapons." Further, he

⁶For further elaboration of the impact of the Korean War on NATO, see Robert Osgood, *NATO: The Entangling Alliance* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), pp. 68-77. See also Samuel P. Huntington, *The Common Defense* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), p. 54, and Samuel F. Wells, Jr., "Sounding the Tocsin: NSC 68 and the Soviet Threat," *International Security* (Fall 1979, Vol. 4, No. 2).

recommended that the new body "should be responsible for the organization of the defense, where appropriate, of individual operational regions such as the Arctic, the Atlantic, the Pacific, and the Indian Ocean."⁶ Most analysts of de Gaulle's foreign policy believe the proposal ultimately proved more tactical than serious, in that the inevitable U.S. unwillingness to share control of American nuclear weapons provided him with the pretext to chart his own course and distance France from the Alliance.

European concerns over American policies were subsequently reinforced by disapproval of U.S. involvement in Vietnam. Not only were the allies critical of U.S. conduct of the war, but NATO's deterrent posture was adversely affected by the U.S. diversion of manpower and material to the Asian theater. Although the Europeans had little real capacity to influence U.S. policy in Vietnam, the long-term result was increasing European reluctance to accept American stewardship of the Alliance. Despite the allies' lack of political capital, they began to seek a stronger voice within NATO. It was against the backdrop of growing differences over global policy that the Alliance met the seventies.

III.

Since the early seventies, out-of-area problems have assumed a new salience. Out-of-area issues no longer simply involve political disputes amongst the allies about one another's activities in the non-Treaty-area world, but instead affect the vital interests of the entire Alliance. The Soviet achievement of strategic parity, and the concomitant emergence of a global Soviet reach, have brought about increased competition between East and West outside Europe. At the same time, the Europeans have sought greater input into the shaping of policies that affect their interests in the Third World.

⁶For an account of the "Tridirectorate" proposal and its implications for relations between France and its NATO allies, see John Newhouse, *De Gaulle and the Anglo-Saxons* (New York: The Viking Press, 1970), pp. 55-84. See also de Gaulle's press conference of September 5, 1960, reproduced in Charles de Gaulle, *Discours et Messages: Avec Le Renouveau*, (Paris: Plan, 1970) pp. 247-250.

Perhaps most importantly, a decade of change and upheaval in Southwest Asia--the British withdrawal from their positions "East of Suez," the Yom Kippur War and the oil crises of 1973-74 and 1978-79, the disintegration of an Iranian regime considered the major regional ally of the West, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan--forced the United States and its European partners to reassess the strategic significance of out-of-area developments to Alliance security. Also it became clear that differences over out-of-area issues had the potential to affect Alliance cohesion, not only politically, as was the case with Suez, but more directly, in terms of economic and military viability.⁷

In the last decade, the United States has sought out-of-area cooperation through two distinct processes. The first, new, and often contentious dimension has been created by the effort to establish a formal NATO channel for the discussion and limited coordination of policy toward Southwest Asia. Envisioning the possibility of a future large-scale American deployment to the Gulf, the United States has tried to establish a framework for involving the allies in its commitment to defending Western interests in that region. In this regard, the U.S. government has sought European political support for its policies as well as military contributions on the part of those allies with the capacity to make them.

The second element of U.S. out-of-area policy has involved a wide range of informal communications with relevant allies that are intended to increase allied contributions and decrease inter-allied frictions on critical issues beyond Europe. The dialogue may be bilateral or multilateral and can cover political, economic, or military issues. Because these exchanges take place on an ad hoc basis, the significance

⁷NATO members had, over the course of the last decade, developed an increasing dependence on Middle Eastern oil. Not only had the share of oil in energy consumption of European OECD members risen from 32.5 percent in 1960 to 59.6 percent in 1970, but the nine EEC countries had to import 63 percent of their energy requirements, and 98 percent of their oil, compared with 17 percent total and 38 percent of its oil for the United States. Statistics cited in Alfred Grosser, *The Western Alliance*, trans. Michael Shaw (New York: Vintage Books for Random House, 1982), p. 276. For a complete discussion about the debate in the Alliance over energy policy, see Robert J. Lieber, *The Oil Decade: Conflict and Cooperation in the West* (New York: Praeger, 1983).

of this informal network is too often underestimated. It is the informal, rather than the formal, mechanisms that continue to produce most allied out-of-area cooperation.

The formal approach to putting out-of-area issues on the NATO agenda was triggered by the recognition that in Southwest Asia, regional instabilities and Soviet designs threatened the vital interests of allied countries and that the U.S. commitment to protect its interests in the Gulf in a crisis would diminish European security by diverting manpower and materiel away from Europe. Reflecting the growing concern in the U.S. government over the strategic situation in Southwest Asia, President Carter announced on January 23, 1980, that the Persian Gulf was a vital interest of the United States and that an assault on it would be "repelled by any means necessary, including military force." At the time, however, planners had not envisaged asking for substantial allied military support for the implementation of the "Carter Doctrine." The 1979 analytical efforts in the Pentagon that underlay the decision to extend a military guarantee to the region were not developed with any cooperative contingency plans in mind, but rather addressed the issue of how the United States could solve the problem by itself.

Yet as the Presidential decision was translated into policy, both in the Pentagon in terms of military planning and at the State Department in terms of a diplomatic strategy, policymakers recognized that the United States not only could not, but should not, go it alone. This was true for three reasons. First, the Rapid Deployment Force (renamed the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force and ultimately designated as the Central Command) was expected to draw on existing forces rather than have new forces created for its use. In a crisis in the Persian Gulf, the U.S. would need to take manpower and materiel away from Europe to fulfill the needs of forces deployed to Southwest Asia. Military planners argue that European security would be significantly affected by a potential U.S. drawdown. Second, European military contributions in the region could add to Western strength, while the American ability to deploy and sustain forces in the region would require overflight rights and access to European bases and facilities.⁸ Finally, it would be

⁸Albert Wohlstetter elaborates on the case for coordinated allied action in the Persian Gulf in *Meeting the Threat in the Persian Gulf*, a

important symbolically to engage the European allies in the defense of Western strategic interests beyond Europe. The failure to do so would not only diminish the deterrent value of the West's commitment to ensuring access to oil, but it would allow the Europeans to become complacent about their own security and perhaps gratuitously critical of U.S. policy.

As a result, the U.S. government developed a strategy for involving the allies in the commitment to the defense of Southwest Asia. The initial step was a campaign to secure NATO's official acknowledgment of the importance of extra-European developments to European security. NATO communiques now recognize the importance of out-of-area discussions within the NATO context, but with the caveat that only those allied countries with the will and capacity to do so should be expected to take action in defense of their interests outside the European theater. This institutional recognition provides the necessary political sanction without which many members, particularly the smaller states, would be unable to make specific military contributions to the out-of-area effort.

In an October 1981 speech at NATO, U.S. Under Secretary of Defense Fred Ikle urged that the allies contribute in three broad areas. These included (a) compensatory measures or "filling in behind" for the U.S. forces and equipment likely to be diverted elsewhere, (b) facilitative measures that involved the provision of overflight rights, access to bases, and European air and sea lift for U.S. and/or European forces to Southwest Asia, and (c) participatory measures that called for the maintenance of peacetime military presences in the region, the provision of regional assistance in the economic and security domains, and force commitments for contingencies.

In fact, the subsequent formal effort within the NATO context has focused almost exclusively on compensatory measures in Europe, since it is here that NATO is directly affected by the U.S. Southwest Asia commitment. In response, NATO members agreed to conduct the Southwest Asia Impact Study (SWAIS) to assess the implications of a U.S.

paper prepared for a meeting of the European American Institute for Security Research held on June 27-29, 1980, published as EAI Paper No. 1, April 1981.

deployment on NATO defenses and to specify possible individual allied remedial actions. Although the SWAIS is not vested with the authority to oblige any ally to make the national resource commitments it recommends, U.S. policymakers expect that the specific European contributions the study identifies as necessary to offset a potential American engagement in the Persian Gulf will then be incorporated into NATO's annual conventional defense planning procedure for Europe.

However, while sustaining the formal approach in the NATO context is a useful means of engaging all the allies in discussions about their global security interests, it has proved to be of limited value. The North Atlantic Council's support for an out-of-area endeavor is a useful political symbol of Western solidarity, but beyond the exploration of possible compensatory measures, NATO is of little use as a mechanism for policy coordination. The sixteen members can barely manage to reach agreement on issues pertaining to European defense; that there should be automatic accord amongst them on extra-European issues is even less self-evident. Attempts to do too much within the NATO context will be frustrated by the resistance of the member states to the implied geographical or functional expansion of Treaty responsibilities, and have the potential to distract the participants in Brussels from their most basic job--providing for the security of NATO territory.

Recognizing the limitations to progress in the formal NATO framework, U.S. policymakers have since 1981 shifted emphasis away from the endeavor to secure NATO's official blessing; instead they have worked to improve out-of-area cooperation through informal channels. Policy coordination has been sought in the corridors and anterooms of the multilateral gatherings and bilateral meetings amongst the allies that occur on a constant basis.

What has evolved is a de facto "Principal Nations" approach to the management of Alliance politics beyond Europe.⁹ On issues such as Lebanon, Chad, Grenada, Namibia, and the Iran-Iraq war, those allies with interests in the relevant region and with the will and capability to protect them meet to discuss and, where appropriate, to concert their

⁹The "Principal Nations" concept was first articulated by Karl Kaiser, Winston Lord, Thierry de Montbrial, and David Watt, in *Western Security: What Has Changed? What Should Be Done?* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1981) pp. 45-48.

policies. This procedure does not imply European subordination to U.S. policy goals; rather, it reflects the degree to which the allied dimension figures critically in the conduct of U.S. and European foreign policies. No actions can be taken without inevitably affecting relations amongst the allies, and few policies can be conducted without considering what the Europeans or the Americans might contribute. Hence, exchanges about out-of-area developments have become an integral part of the daily business of Alliance politics.

Further allied cooperation with regard to the Southwest Asia scenario is discussed primarily outside the formal NATO channel, and as such provides an example of the predominance and utility of this approach. Facilitative agreements, including basing or access arrangements with countries such as Germany, Portugal, Spain, and Turkey, are negotiated between relevant parties on a bilateral basis. As far as actual participation at present is concerned, only two European allies have the capacity to play a significant military role--Great Britain and France. The British maintain an intermittent presence in the Indian Ocean of one or two ships and have organized the Fifth Infantry Brigade for operations outside Europe. The French are currently keeping approximately fourteen ships in the Indian Ocean region. Their 1984-88 defense budget also funds the development of a five-division Rapid Action Force involving 47,000 men.¹⁰ These contributions could prove important, particularly in lower-level contingencies. They also demonstrate collective Western resolve, and thereby could diminish the U.S.-Soviet dimension of any crisis.

Another example of some of the positive as well as negative aspects of informal out-of-area cooperation was provided by the Multinational Peacekeeping Force (MNF) in Lebanon. Those allies involved were there for individual reasons of national interest--the French because of a long-standing historical commitment to the country as well as an ongoing desire to play a role in any Middle East settlement process, the British as a symbol of their renewed commitment to defend their interests beyond the North Atlantic, the Italians as proof that they too can make a

¹⁰For further information on British and French military capabilities, see *The Military Balance, 1983-84* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1983). Also see John Vinocur, "French Wary on Closer Tie to NATO," *New York Times*, December 1, 1983, p. 3.

significant contribution to allied security whether within or beyond Europe. They were all there because they believed that they had a greater chance of advancing Western interests in Lebanon and the Middle East if they acted collectively. In addition, they recognized that a pronounced failure to cooperate could undermine not only their interests in the region but would create dangerous precedents within the Alliance as well.

The meetings of the MNF foreign ministers constituted an ad hoc group not only for the organization of their Lebanon efforts but also for the broader coordination of their Middle Eastern policies. They met frequently in bilateral and multilateral contexts--on the margins of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in early September 1983, on the sidelines of the opening of the United Nations General Assembly in late September, and during official visits on both sides of the Atlantic throughout the summer, fall, and winter of 1983-84. There were also working-level political and military meetings in Washington, the three European capitals, and Beirut on a regular basis. These meetings produced guidelines for allied action and provided a discreet opportunity for differences to be worked out away from the glare of spotlights. This did not, of course, prevent the public airing of disagreements or frustration with one another's behavior, but the consultative process minimized the extent to which these might be damaging to shared objectives in Lebanon or to the fabric of the Alliance.

For almost a year, the presence of the MNF bolstered the Gemayel government and helped create an environment for political dialogue. The collapse of Lebanon was certainly not due to a lack of allied cooperation.¹¹ Indeed considering the magnitude of the strategic defeat the West suffered, there has been precious little recrimination, if compared to Suez or the three previous Middle East wars, amongst the

¹¹In "Western Peacekeeping in Lebanon: Lessons of the MNF," Luigi Caligaris argues that while there was close coordination among the national contingents, it was still not close enough. Hence the effectiveness of the MNF was diminished by the failure to create a joint inter-allied command on the military level. Yet he recognizes the difficulties inherent in such a scheme, particularly because of each state's inclination to preserve freedom of action. See *Survival*, Vol. XXVI, No. 6, November-December 1984, pp. 262-68.

allies over the handling of the situation. Thus despite the piecemeal withdrawal of the MNF, the experience in Lebanon should not inhibit out-of-area cooperation in the future.

Conversely, the U.S. intervention in Grenada underlined the shortcomings of the informal consultative procedure, and highlighted the impact that an out-of-area development can have on allied solidarity. In Europe, there was frustration with the American failure to consult adequately in advance of the invasion. British Prime Minister Thatcher's pride was piqued by the U.S. refusal to refrain from precipitous action, and her government's critical public statements kindled a noisy debate in Europe about whether the United States could be trusted with control over Cruise and Pershing II missiles if the American government would not consult properly over the fate of a former British colony. In Washington, there was irritation with European criticisms of the U.S. action and, in light of U.S. support for the U.K. during the Falklands War, outright anger with the British.

Grenada showed that, at times, national interests are not consistent with Alliance interests and that concerns over allied support are overpowered by pressing national security requirements. The existence of institutionalized consultative mechanisms would probably not have prevented the initial disagreements over Grenada; the need to maintain total secrecy before the landing on the island would in any case have precluded meticulous advance consultations. Although the speed and success of the military operation substantially reduced the potential fallout on the Alliance, the episode demonstrated the capacity of out-of-area disputes to erode basic Alliance relationships.

IV.

The out-of-area debate reflects the everyday politics of the Alliance in that it rests heavily on the differing interests and perspectives of the individual member states. Attitudes toward out-of-area problems are directly linked to the political climates in allied countries, and domestic constraints play a key role in determining whether there will be friction or cooperation over any given issue. Although when vital interests are at stake, self-preservation usually

dictates cooperation amongst principal allies (contingency planning for a crisis in the Persian Gulf being the leading case in point), most cases are not so clear-cut and require a delicate balancing of global realities with national temperaments and domestic politics.

In the United States, mounting unilateralism on the right and isolationism on the left have been both the cause and the effect of frustration over out-of-area cooperation with the allies. The degree of European support for U.S. global foreign policy objectives has become a hot political issue. On Capitol Hill, "burden-sharing" has again become the buzzword for the debate about the benefits that accrue to the United States from its European commitments. Congress expects to see tangible evidence that the allies are bearing their fair share of the defense burden in exchange for the continued provision of military funding necessary for NATO's security. The perceived unwillingness of the allies to increase their conventional defense contributions, in part to offset the U.S. Southwest Asia strategy, is held up by critics of the American commitment to Europe as an example of the unworthiness of the NATO allies and of the one-sided nature of the relationship. As evidence of the conflicting views on out-of-area cooperation with allies within the U.S. government, in opposition to those pushing for enhanced out-of-area coordination, are some defense planners who argue that the allies are so unreliable that crisis contingency planning should never be based upon the expectation of allied support.

Within the U.S. executive branch, the making of out-of-area policy is complicated by the fact that the issues at stake inevitably cut across bureaucratic boundaries. What the State Department's Europeanists advocate--policies most likely to produce positive results with U.S. allies--may not necessarily be what the other regional or functional experts at State, the Department of Defense, the CIA, or on the National Security Council perceive to be in the U.S. (or in their own) interest. On a daily basis, there are turf battles over the objectives and implementation of policy.

As a result, efforts to involve the allies in the formulation of policy, or to respond to allied initiatives, are at best ad hoc. Those with responsibility for other regions often make policy without regard for the impact it may have on Europe or on Alliance goals. Grenada

exemplified this phenomenon from the allied perspective, in that those planning the invasion failed to consider adequately its implications for U.S. objectives in Europe.

On the European side of the Atlantic, there are myriad views about the virtues and vices of out-of-area cooperation. Broadly defined, there is general resistance to formal, institutionalized cooperation. There is widespread concern that U.S. policy, and particularly that of the Reagan Administration, relies too heavily on military actions rather than on diplomatic endeavors, and that it continually polarizes situations by injecting an East-West dimension into them. Underlying this is the basic fear that United States foreign policy will drag Europe into unwanted conflict in the Third World or bring war to Europe. Yet when the allies are confronted with specific problems outside Europe that directly affect their interests, this resistance often proves atmospheric rather than substantive.

Any discussion of the out-of-area contributions that the Europeans can make is largely focused on the potential military role of the four principal allied players: the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Germany. This is not to say that other allies do not count; contributions can be made at many levels, with diplomatic initiatives and economic assistance being important options for those not willing or able to make military commitments. The Portuguese provide critical facilitative assistance, the Canadians participate in the Namibia Contact Group, and several allies provide troops for the United Nations Forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL). On the southeastern flank of NATO, Turkey plays a vital role. In a crisis, U.S. strategists would hope to have access to bases in the eastern part of the country as staging areas for a deployment to the Gulf region, although the Turkish government is formally committed only to the facilitation of NATO-approved actions.¹²

¹²See Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle's March 7, 1984, testimony and exchange with Senator Joseph Biden, in *Security and Development Assistance*, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 98th Congress, Second Session (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1984), pp. 362 and 396-399.

To the British, out-of-area developments are hardly a novel problem given their imperial history. In addition, the "special relationship" with the United States has always included wide-ranging consultation on global developments. There are a multitude of issues with which the British have dealt and continue to deal--Oman, Belize, Hong Kong, Zimbabwe, the Falklands, Namibia, Lebanon. The Falklands War was a catalyst for Britain in terms of its renewed global role; Thatcher brilliantly capitalized on the British desire to reemerge from a slump of the seventies as a world player of confidence and conviction.

The U.K. campaign in the South Atlantic demonstrated to the British public the utility of forces that have the capacity to act in defense of their interests both within and beyond Europe. The relative slowness of their military response also provided the impetus for the development of an enhanced capability to respond with speed outside the NATO area.¹³ Further, the fact that the war "could not have been mounted, let alone won, without American help"¹⁴ reinforced the critical nature of allied support for each other's global commitments.

However, while Thatcher has publicly extolled the virtues of both formal and informal out-of-area cooperation, her government also argues that a highly visible NATO, and predominantly American, presence beyond Europe could be potentially destabilizing. Indeed, the British advocate a policy of "carving up the cake"--of splitting up responsibilities according to historical ties and current strategic advantage. The division of labor they recommend involves the formation of ad hoc groups to deal with problems as they arise, and the maximization of individual allied strengths by allowing each to take the lead where it has the strongest record.

¹³For more on the implications of the Falklands War for British military planning with respect to out-of-area contingencies, see *The Falklands Campaign: The Lessons* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, December 1982), pp. 31-36.

¹⁴"America's Falklands War: A Relationship Sweet and Sour," *The Economist*, March 3, 1984, p. 29.

The British sustain a three-dimensional political-military effort in the Third World, with particular emphasis (despite the East of Suez withdrawal) on Southwest Asia. First, they provide military assistance and training to countries of importance to Western interests, with the goal of helping the recipients consolidate their own defense capabilities. Oman is the most salient example of this form of commitment. Second, they sustain the capacity to deploy periodically British forces beyond Europe in order to demonstrate a military presence in a chosen region, such as the Indian Ocean, Cyprus, Kenya or Malaysia. Third, as a result of the Falklands, they have reaffirmed that they will be able to deploy on demand an intervention force in an out-of-area crisis.

To the French, acceptable Alliance arrangements do not diminish sovereignty. President Mitterrand's stated policy of "independence and solidarity" toward the Atlantic Alliance reflects this determination to have it both ways. The inherent paradox of the French attitude toward out-of-area cooperation is that resistance to formal cooperation permits coordination of policies where it matters.

France withdrew from NATO's integrated military command structure in 1966, after which it remained a participant at the political level but gained independence in the military domain. This stance toward NATO allows French governments the maximum margin of maneuver. From their autonomous military posture, the French are free to cooperate when and where it suits them at the military level. In fact, it is the public separation between political and military cooperation that permits the Ministry of Defense to coordinate on a wide range of out-of-area issues with its Atlantic partners. Navy-to-navy talks in the Indian Ocean are a low-visibility example of this. Conversely, because France remains a member of the political branch of the Alliance, and because French statesmen are vulnerable to public disapproval of any decision that compromises French independence, cooperation on the political level is a much more sensitive domestic issue.

French rejection of any systematic, institutionalized out-of-area cooperation at the political level does not, however, prevent France from coordinating its efforts with its NATO allies through informal

channels. In the last few years, discreet political and military exchanges have proved a highly effective means of getting things done. To look around the world today is to find the French actively engaged in defending the interests of the West. In Chad, French paratroops have held the line against Libyan-backed insurgents; in the Gulf, the French have the most significant allied military presence, as well as a valued Indian Ocean presence in Djibouti. Their capabilities in Southwest Asia have recently been upgraded through the creation of the new quick intervention capability. In Lebanon, the French remained on the ground longer than any other peacekeeping force; in Nicaragua, since their initial sale of arms to the Sandinistas in 1981, they have sold no more weapons and have toned down their criticism of U.S. policy. Given that any effort to formalize out-of-area cooperation at the political level with the French is virtually certain to fail, and that there will inevitably be an undercurrent of diplomatic friction, actual French cooperation with the allies on out-of-area issues has been surprisingly good.

The Italian search for political credibility--and with it, equal status with the U.K., France, and Germany--has brought about a major evolution in Italian strategic thinking.¹⁵ This change has consequentially altered Italy's willingness to assume responsibility for a share of the political and military burden beyond Europe. In 1980, Defense Minister Lelio Lagorio established three goals that would demonstrate Italy's commitment to a new international role: an increased capability in the Mediterranean, ensured neutrality for Malta, and participation in the International Peacekeeping in the Sinai.

The decision to join the Sinai force was perhaps the most significant foreign policy choice Italy has made since its decision to join the Atlantic Alliance in 1949. For the first time since the Second World War, Italian troops set foot on soil outside the NATO area. Out-of-area participation through peacekeeping is intended to provide Italy access to major power status within the Alliance. Indeed Italian involvement reflected the predominance, over other divisive issues, of

¹⁵For a more complete exposition of the evolution in Italian strategic thinking over the last decade, see Luigi Caligaris, "Italian Defence Policy: Problems and Prospects," *Survival*, March-April 1983, pp. 68-76.

the commitment to give Italy a new image, since Italy had been opposed to the Camp David approach. Subsequent participation in the MNF in Beirut was not only easier because the precedent had already been set, but because a large portion of the Italian people believed they were there to protect the Palestinians.¹⁶

To fulfill its new commitments, Italy has established its own interservice intervention force. Although plagued by insufficient funds and rivalries amongst the services, this force has supplied the manpower and material for the Italian contingents in the Sinai and in Lebanon. At present, however, this represents the leading edge of Italian willingness and ability to take action outside of Europe in defense of Western interests. A more significant contribution will be possible only if Italy develops a greater military capacity to sustain commitments.

In Germany, any discussion of institutionalized out-of-area cooperation is taboo. The Basic German Law states that Germany may use its armed forces only for purposes of self-defense, or, in the context of NATO responsibilities, within the European theater. It is not, however, these often cited legal restrictions that inhibit the conduct of German foreign policy beyond Europe, but rather that the out-of-area issue touches the two most sensitive nerves in contemporary Germany.

The first is the legacy of two world wars and the residue of extreme sensitivity to other people's neuroses about any revival of German nationalist behavior or, more specifically, to seeing German soldiers "on the march" again. The strong disinclination toward a great power role for Germany is deeply embedded in the conscience of this generation's leadership and underlies their negative attitude toward any military involvement outside Europe.

The second exposed nerve is the residual intra-German predicament. As a divided country, the relationship on the internal German border is of critical import. If an East-West dimension is injected into Third World conflicts, then a German military role in the developing world, particularly if identified with an American effort, might put additional

¹⁶Enrico Jacchia, "Beirut Role Has Italians Worrying," *International Herald Tribune*, May 6, 1983, p. 4.

pressure on an already tense situation. Moreover, the Germans argue that they must concentrate their efforts on ensuring stability on the Central Front--that any more extended commitment of their resources would detract from that effort, thereby diminishing the security of NATO as a whole.

Yet this does not mean that the Germans have no interest in maintaining a stable situation in the world beyond Europe. While they will not actively participate in an out-of-area military venture, they have agreed to provide facilitative assistance in a crisis, contingent upon adequate advance notification and consultation. They rely on economic aid as their primary foreign policy tool in the Third World, arguing that problems like those in Central America are due to economic underdevelopment and that a military response may only polarize moderate regimes. With regard to Southwest Asia and the formal NATO effort, they provide military aid to key NATO southern flank countries such as Greece, Turkey, and Portugal and development assistance to Pakistan (to which they are the largest contributor after the United States), Egypt, and the Sudan.

This array of attitudes toward formal and informal out-of-area cooperation is evidence that the struggle over who should set policy for the Alliance both within and beyond Europe is endemic to the partnership. The overlap of political, economic, and strategic interests is not as readily apparent beyond Europe as it is within. In the Third World, it is no secret that the allies can be competitors for influence and markets. Because in some areas allied governments must let the United States take the lead, in others they may try to compensate by acting independently. The current race to establish lucrative trading relationships with Arab states, particularly in the arms industry, is another indicator of the limits to shared interests beyond Europe.

Perhaps most significantly, underlying the out-of-area debate is a wide gap in assessments of the Soviet global threat. (The same has been manifested in divergent interpretations of detente.) In explaining regional instabilities, the Europeans are more likely to ascribe greater relative weight to local as well as social and economic causes, whereas the United States (or at least the current Administration) is more

inclined to blame the Soviets and emphasize the military dimension of policy. This is especially true in the ongoing U.S.-European debate over the situation in Central America.

V.

Minimizing the inevitably divisive aspects of U.S.-European relations beyond Europe is a permanent feature of Alliance politics. The objectives of allied out-of-area efforts should be twofold: first, to increase Western security by furthering the global interests of the Alliance, and second, to limit the negative "spillover" of extra-European problems on the core NATO security agenda.

Fundamental, however, to the out-of-area issue is the fact that the allies have real divergences in perceptions of the threat, stakes involved, and means they are willing to use to defend their interests beyond Europe. These differences cannot and should not be papered over; they are intrinsic to an alliance of independent and sovereign states. The question thus arises as to whether the "two-track" approach described here--the formal for certain NATO politics related to Southwest Asia and the informal for the full range of bilateral and multilateral exchanges that take place amongst the allies--is adequate for the management of out-of-area challenges.

The temptation for far-reaching reform certainly exists. One possibility (entertained largely by those who fail to understand the dynamics of alliance politics) would be to extend the physical domain of the formal Treaty area and thereby to obligate collective defense efforts beyond Europe in, for example, Southwest Asia. In principle, this would solve a key part of the out-of-area problem or, rather, end it. This region, deemed of vital interest to the Alliance, would become part of the Alliance itself. Thus if a crisis were to erupt in the Persian Gulf, the allies would be required by their collective defense responsibilities to take military action in defense of common interests there.

In fact, an effort to enlarge the Treaty area would do precisely the opposite. An expansion would be impossible to achieve because of allied resistance to being formally bound to support one another's

global concerns. The allies would be unable to agree upon what interests were vital and what kinds of threats required a collective response. In addition, any such extension of the Treaty area would bring about a dilution of the already stretched economic and military resources (not to mention political consensus) of the Alliance. As Hans Morgenthau has observed, "There exists a correlation between the permanency of an alliance and the limited character of the interests it serves; for only such a specific, limited interest is likely to last long enough to provide the foundation for a durable alliance."¹⁷ Making out-of-area cooperation a point of principle for the Alliance would only increase allied friction by making it into a divisive issue in its own right.

Another option, more serious and more often cited, would create new mechanisms or institutions to promote out-of-area cooperation.¹⁸ It is argued that the existence of a mechanism devoted solely to the discussion and coordination of policies beyond the European theater would ensure the maximum amount of understanding and the minimum amount of disagreement amongst the allies. This organization could provide a vehicle for the coordination of Alliance out-of-area policy similar to those that have been established over the last few years to oversee difficult Alliance decisions in the nuclear area. The group might proceed with contingency planning for a variety of scenarios and when needed could serve as a crisis-management clearinghouse. As such, it might reduce the likelihood of surprises like the Falklands and Grenada to the Alliance.

This approach ignores the reality that differences over out-of-area policy are caused less by consultative breakdowns than by differences of priorities and objectives. The roadblocks to cooperation are not procedural but substantive. Moreover, to the extent that imperfect consultations are a cause of the problem, it is not at all clear that new institutional mechanisms would be the solution.

¹⁷Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 5th ed. (New York, Knopf, 1973), pp. 192-193.

¹⁸Sir Nicholas Henderson, the British Ambassador to Washington during the Falklands War, called for the establishment of such new mechanisms in "Behind the British Anger Over Grenada," *Washington Post*, November 6, 1983.

Cooperation evolves on a case-by-case basis, determined by mutual interests, rather than because of some abstract commitment to consult or perfect procedural arrangements. Further, while the non-binding nature of the informal process has the potential to upset the Alliance and its bilateral relationships, a more routinized approach to out-of-area management would be likely to create problems of its own. Within the Alliance framework, each ally tries to maintain as much autonomy as possible. If the proposed forum were limited to discussion, it would be unnecessary because myriad opportunities for exchanges of views already exist; if the concept were to create a process by which Alliance approval would be required before any state could act outside Europe, it would be rejected by all as an infringement on their sovereignty and a constraint on their freedom of maneuver.

This is not to say that there is nothing to be done. While major structural changes are not likely to be effective, the United States should keep up the effort in both formal and informal channels to encourage the allies to share global responsibilities. Within NATO, it should continue to insist on institutional recognition of the importance of out-of-area cooperation to Alliance security. This will force those allies who do not play a significant role in the world beyond Europe at a minimum to sustain a dialogue with their partners about mutual interests outside the Treaty area.

The United States will also need to keep up the campaign for augmented defense contributions in terms of money, material, and manpower to sustain both its European and its Southwest Asian commitments. In doing so, American policymakers must be careful. Too shrill a campaign for greater allied efforts beyond Europe could well create acrimony and greater unwillingness to do more. Equally, too much emphasis on these compensatory measures could be detrimental to Alliance interests in the long run, in that it would allow the Europeans to hide behind the banner of compensation in Europe to avoid making the commitment to taking action elsewhere. This sort of allied resistance to engagements in the world beyond Europe could create a dangerous bifurcation of perspectives and commitments, in which the United States would claim unilateral responsibility for global decisions and the Europeans might take increasingly parochial views of their security interests.

The effort to coordinate global foreign policy goals through the informal process should also be continued. Allied management of the simmering Iran-Iraq conflict has proved the utility of this approach. Beginning in 1980, the United States, France, and Great Britain agreed to coordinate naval maneuvers in the Indian Ocean region in an effort to deter further escalation of the crisis. Since then, the three countries have met in bilateral and multilateral settings to discuss the developments in the war and to evaluate the need for concerted action to prevent either a blockage of the Straits of Hormuz or the exportation of Iran's fundamentalist revolution beyond its own borders. While these exchanges have often highlighted the differences among the participants' approaches to resolving problems in Southwest Asia, they have also increased the deterrent capability of the West in the region. Moreover, they provide some insurance against a major crisis in allied resolve over energy policy, such as took place in 1973-74 and 1978-79. Thus even in the absence of formal mechanisms to cope with the situation, this sort of ad hoc "Principal Nations" group has been able to work to advance Western interests.

In August of 1984, the effectiveness of the informal approach was again demonstrated by the Red Sea minesweeping operation. At the invitation of the Egyptian and Saudi governments, the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, and the Netherlands agreed to participate in the search for mines in the vital Gulf of Suez waterway. While there was European resistance to any public and formalized "allied" effort, a distinction was drawn here as in other out-of-area cases between overt *cooperation* and the less highly visible *coordination* that often takes place largely on a military-to-military basis. In terms of collective objectives in the region and individual allied interests, it proved preferable to maintain the illusion that actions were taken independently, even if they were in fact carefully coordinated with others. Moreover, upholding international principles of freedom of navigation through a peaceful search for mines was clearly more palatable to all concerned than the kind of joint military action that might be required in a more critical situation.

Whether in the face of a major crisis this or any other arrangement would be enough to protect Western interests or maintain solidarity is impossible to predict. Indeed more often than not, managing the politics of out-of-area developments within the Alliance will be a damage-limiting effort. There are no universal or permanent solutions to the out-of-area problem. Allies will act in concert, or on behalf of one another's policies, if they perceive that action to be in their self-interest. The case must repeatedly be made that the failure to concert policies where vital interests are at stake will not only undermine Western interests around the world but the Alliance itself.

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